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... when, in my philosophical disquisitions, I deny a provi- 
dence and a future state, I undermine not the foundations of 
socieiy, but advance principies, which they [the religio~is phi- 
losophers] themselves, upon their own topics, if they argue 
consistently, mustallow to besolid andsatisfactory. David Hume, 
(ECHU 13).' 
RESUMEN El presente artículo trata del concepto de ateismo presente en la filosofía moderna. 
Se exponen asílos diferentes tipos acudiendo a las teorías de Locke, Pufendorf, Barbeyrac, Bayle 
A través de ellas se intenta situar la postura de Hume 
La pnmera conclusión señala que Hume es claramente ateo en el sentido en que rechaza la 
existencia de una divinidad que se ocupe de los asuntos humanos Además Hume considera que 
la religión hace imposible la moralidad 
La segunda conclusión afirma que la postura humeana se acercaría a la epicúrea al mantener que 
la moralidad tiene un fundamento radicalmente distinto al de la religión Hume puede ser 
considerado un escéptico en matena religiosa pero no en lo que respecta a la moral Hume es, más 
bien, un humanista que defiende una moral autónoma El único fundamento de dicha moralidad 
hay que buscarlo en la naturaleza humana 
In prepanng ths paper 1 have benefited from the use of "Bayle, Barbeyrac and Hume", an unpublished paper 
by Prof James Moore, and also from the comments of Profs James Tully, Knud Haakonssen, Marcus Hester 
and J B Schneewind 
Abbreviations of works cited m the text are as follows 
B M~scellaneous Reflecrlons, Occaslon'd by the Comet w h ~ c h  appear'd ln December 1680 C h l e f i  tending 
to explode Popular Superstltlons, Pierre Bayle, trans from the French, 2 vols (London J Morphew, 1708) 
According the Descartes, and atheist might in some sense be said to know a simple 
mathematical proposition (that the three angles of a triangle are equal to two right angles, 
for example), but this knowledge of the atheist «cannot constitute true science, because 
no knowledge that can be rendered doubtful should be called science)), while the atheist, 
by definition, «cannot be sure that he is not deceived in the things that seem most evident 
to him ... doubt ... may come up, if he examines the matter, or if another suggests it; he 
can never be safe from it unless he first recognizes the existence of a ~ o d » . ~  
If Descartes was concerned about what the atheist could truly know, many of his 
contemporaries were deeply concerned wiht wat we could know about the atheist. They 
were concerned, to be more specific, about the morals of the atheist: could an atheist 
actually be honest, morally upright, a trustworthy and reliable member of society? 
Could there be, perhaps, a society of atheists? 
Opinion was, in general, decidedly negative. To be sure Francis Bacon had 
suggested that atheists were not so wicked as idolaters, and Hugo Grotius said that the 
basic principies of natural law, derived as they were from the facts of human nature, were 
sufficiently clear to have effect even if one should maintain so wicked and disasterful 
a notion as the nonexistence of God: ((That the Laws ofNature would take Place, slzould 
+ve (as we cannot wlthout the most horrid imp~ety) deny eifher the Belnp of GOD, or hzs 
Concern ln human ~ u s i n e s s x . ~  
Even so carefully framed a concession was, however, repudiated with alarm over 
and over again. Richard Bentley, the first of the Boyle Lecturers, can be seen as typical. 
The atheist, he wrote 
allows no Natural Morality, nor any other distinction of Good and Evil, 
Just and Unjust; than as Human Institution and the modes and fashions of 
various Countries do denominate them. The most Heroica1 Actions or 
detestable Villanies are in the nature of things indifferent to his approbation; 
if by secrecy they are alike conceal'd from Rewards or Punishements, from 
Ignominy or  lause use.^ 
- 
D: Dialogues concerning i\'arurul Religion, David Hume, ed. N. Kemp Smith (Indianapolis: Bobbs-Menill, 1947) 
ECHG: Hume's Enquiries concerning Hutnatl Undersrunding ar~d 
ECPM: concernlng [he Principies of Morals, ed. L. A. Selby-Bigge and P. H. Nidditch. 3d ed. (Oxford: The 
Clarendon Press, 1975) 
NHR: NururalHisior)~ofRelrgron, inDuvidHurne: The Philosophicc~lCi/orks,ed. T. H .  GreenandT. H. Grose, 
4 vols. (Darmstadt: Scientia Verlag Aalen. 1964, reprint of edition of 1886) 
P: Of the Law ofNuture undi\~ations, Samuel Pufendorf. trans. by Basil Kennet, et al. with the notes by Jeari 
Barbeyrac (London: J. Walthoe. et al., 1729) 
T: A Treutise oj'Humun Nuture, David Hume, ed. L. A. Selby-Bigge and P. H. Nidditch, 2d ed. (Oxford: The 
Clarendon Press, 1978) 
W: David Hitme: T l ~ e  Philosop/iical Works cited above 
T/le Philosopl~ical Works ofDescurtes, ed. and trans. E. S. Haldane and G. R. T. Ross, 2 vols. (New York: 
Dover, 1955), 2: 39. 
For Bacon's views see his essays, "Of Atheism" and "Of Superstition". The remark by Grotius is from 
his De jitre be111 ac pacis. Prolegomena. as cited by Pufendorf. p. 142. 
Richard Bentley, Tlze Folly ofArheism. . A  Serrnon Preached in [he Churtiz of St. ~Martrn in the Fields .. 
(London: Tho. Parkhurst, et al., 1692). p. 3. as reprinted inEight Boyle Lectures on Atheisnl1692 (New York: 
Garland Publishing, 1976). 
And he goes on to accuse the atheists of seeking to undo the «Cement of Society» 
and to reduce man to a state of confusion: 
No community ever was or can be begun or maintain'd, but upon the 
Basis of Religion. What Gover nment can be imagin'd without Judicial 
Proceedings? and what methods of Judicature without a Religious Oath; 
which implies an Omniscient Being, as conscious of its falshood or truth, and 
a revenger of Perjury? So that the very nature of an Oath (and therefore of 
Society also) is subverted by the Atheist; who professeth to acknowledge 
nothing superiour to himself, no omnipotent observer of the actions of men. 
For an Atheist to compose a System of Politicks is ... absurd and ridiculous ...5 
John Locke had expressed much the same view. In his Letter corzcernirzg Toleration 
he argues that «those are not at al1 to be tolerated to deny the being of a God. Promises, 
covenants, and oaths, which are the bonds of human society, can have no hold upon an 
atheist. The taking away of God, though but even in thought, dissolves a11».~ In his even 
more influential Essay concerning Human Understandirig Locke went on to argue that 
«what Duty is, cannot be understood without a Law; nor a Law be known, or supposed 
without a Law-maker, or without Reward and Punishment)), and, although our practica1 
principies are not innate, they do nonetheles presuppose the ideas of «God, of Law, of 
Obligation, of Punishment, of a Life after this  D.^ In a manuscript work on ethics he 
wrote: 
The original1 & foundation of al1 Law is dependency. A dependent 
intelligent being is under the power & direction & dominion of him on whom 
he depends & must be for the ends appointed him by ye superior being. If man 
were independent he could have noe law but his own will noe end but himself. 
He would be a god to himself, & ye satisfaction of his own will the sole 
measure & end of al1 his a c t i o n ~ . ~  
Samuel Pufendorf, now too seldom discussed, but perhaps the most influential 
moralist of this period, repeatedly took the atheists to t a ~ k . ~  A concem for one's own 
Bentley, p. 35. At this point Bentley has Hobbes particularly in mind. 
John Locke, The Second Treatise of Civil Goi~eriirnerir and A Leiter- Concei.nirig Tolerairon, ed. J .  W .  
Gough (Oxford: Basil Blackwell. 1948). p. 156. 
John Locke, An Essay concer-ning Hilrnan Undersrandirig. ed. P. H. Nidditch (Oxford: The Clarendon 
Press, 1979) p. 74 (1.3.12). 
MS. C28. fol. 141. cited from John Colman. John Locke's Mor-al Philosophy (Edinburgh: Edinburgh 
University Press, 1983), p. 46. Colman says: "The theory which is sketched in the Two Trucis and expounded 
in detail in the Essays is essentially theological and legalist. Locke holds that, were there no God or had He 
not pron~ulgated a law to mankind there would be no such things as moral nght and wrong. virtue and vice. 
He also maintains that ... rhe ultimate reason a person has for living virtuously is that God's law is backed by 
sanctions, that in the next life virtue will be rewarded and vice punished". (p. 5) 
Pufendorf (1632-1694) held the first chair of natural and international law at a German university 
(Heidelberg), was later Professor of Natural Law at Lund. Court Historian to, first, the King of Sweden. and 
then to the Elector of Brandenburg. Thirty years after Pufendorf's death. Francis Hutcheson said that he had 
become "the grand Instructor in Morals to al1 who have of late given themselves to that Study", while the 
Professor of Moral Philosophy at Edinburgh in the 1730s was, according to Alexander Carlyle, still basing 
preservation is, he grants, a fact from which a law of nature of a certain kind, a dictate 
of reason, may be deduced, but «to give these Dictates of Reason the Force and 
Authority of Laws, there is aNecessity of supposing that there is aGod, and that his wise 
Providence oversees and govems the whole World, and in aparticular Manner the Lives 
and Affairs of Mankind)). The «wicked and absurd Hypothesis)) of atheism, should it be 
accepted, would leave us without moral law, for the «edicts of Reasonx cannot «rise so 
high as to pass into a Condition of Laws; in us much as al1 Law supposes a superior 
Power». (P 141-42) 
Later in the same work Pufendorf speaks of our ((connate Obligations)), or those that 
are, «planted, as it were, in our Being)). The most eminent of these is that 
which lies on al1 Men with respect to Almighty God, the supream 
Govemor of the World; by Virtue of which we are bound to adore his 
Majesty, and to obey his Commandments and his Laws. Whoever wholly 
violates and breaks through this Obligation, stands guilty of the most heinous 
Charge of Atheism, because he must at the same time deny either the 
Existence of God, or his Care of human Affairs. Which two Sins, with regard 
to their moral Consequences and Effects, are equivalent to each other; and 
either of them overthrows al1 Religion, representing it as a frightful Mockery, 
introduced to awe the ignorant Vulgar into some Decency and Duty. (P 254) 
Pufendorf goes on to denounce even the seemingly innocuous view of Hobbes, 
namely, that atheism is the result of ignorance or imprudence.1° This view is said to be 
«most foul and scandalous», for, although one cannot say that every illiterate person is 
able to form or even to comprehend a «philosophical Demonstration of God's Exist- 
ente», this gives us no grounds for doubting or denying his existence. Those with the 
effrontery to so doubt are challenged, not only to defend their atheism, but also to show 
that it will contribute more to mankind than does the contrary view, theism, or the 
«Acknowledgment of a Deity)). (P 254-55) 
The task here set for the atheist, that he provide, in effect, an entirely new foundation 
for the concourse of humankind, is said to be manifestly impossible, if for no other 
his lectures on a short version of Pufendorf's Of the Law ofNature andNations. See Hutcheson, A Collcctiori 
ofLeners andEssuys on Sei,eral Suhjects, latel~l Puhlish'd in the Duhlin Journal, (London: J .  Darby, et al., 
1729), as reprinted in Francis Hutcheson, Opera iMinora (Georg Olms: Hildesheim, 1971), pp. 102-03; and 
Carlyle,Anecdotes andCharacrers of rheT~mes,  ed. James Kinsley (London: OxfordUniversity Press. 1973), 
p. 26. For a stimulating introduction to Pufendorf's ethical views anda brief account of recent work on him, 
see J. B. Schneewind, "Pufendorf and the History of Ethics", Synrhese, forthcoming. 
lo  Although Hobbes was often thought to be an atheist, and was denounced soundly for his views, the 
explicit teaching of his Leviathan is close to that of Bentley, Pufendorf, and the other anti-atheists. He "only 
is properly said to reign", he wntes, "that govems his subjects by his word, and by promise of rewards to those 
that obey it, and by threatening them with punishrnent that obey it not. Subjects therefore in the kingdom of 
God, are not bodies inanimate, nor creatures irrational; because they understand no precepts as his: nor 
atheists; nor they that believe not that God has any care of the actions of mankind; because they acknowledge 
no word for his, nor have hope of his rewards or fear of his threatenings. They therefore that believe there is 
a God that governeth the world, and hath given precepts, and propounded rewards, and punishments to 
manklnd, are God's subjects: al1 the rest, are to be understood as enemies". (Part 11. 31, Oakeshott edition) 
reason than that one simply cannot rely on the word of any atheist. Those «who either 
deny the Being, or the Providence of God», or those very like to them, «the Maintainers 
of the Mortality and Impunity of human Souls», are beyond our trust, for nothing can 
motivate such persons but pnvate interest and advantage. The promises and covenants 
of an atheist are no better than those of any commoncriminal, while those who do believe 
in God have the advantage of motivation that derives from concern about eterna1 reward 
or punishment. 
For 'tis impossible, but than Men of these Principies should measure al1 
Right and al1 Justice by their own Profit and Convenience. Into the same Herd 
we may pack al1 those who practise come Villany or Vice for their set Trade 
and Employment; as Pirates, Thieves, Murtherers, Pimps, Courtesans, and 
other profligate Wretches who take Perjury for a Tnfle, and make a Jest of 
sacred Obligations. (P 276)" 
Pufendorf's widespread influence in the Protestant universities of his time was in no 
small part due to the translations and annotations of another professor of law, Jean 
Barbeyrac. Not content with translating Pufendorf's attack on the atheists. Barbeyrac, 
by means of copious notes, amplified this attack, and then tumed to the subject again his 
own Historical and Critica1 Account of the Science ofMorali o... from the earliest Times 
down to the Publication ofpufendorf. Granted, Barbeyrac sometimes appears to soften 
Pufendorf's strictures, as when he cites those who have argued that atheists are not, 
really, always so bad as pirates, pimps, and murderers, while on another occasion he 
goes so far as to consider the possibility «that Religion is neither the only, nor principal 
Basis of Society». (P 2 7 6 ,  142) In fact, he admits that 
there may be amongst these Atheists, Men of Sense and Philosophers, 
who, reflecting that it is better for Men to subject themselves to certain Rules 
of Life, than for every Man to follow his Humours only, may observe [these 
Rules] outwardly, so far as they are exempt from such Circumstances, as 
some great Interest present, or come violent Passion forces them upon, such 
Counsels as are reasonable, calm and aware of the Consequences. 
At the same time, however, Barbeyrac appears to take back these concessions and 
simply to second Pufendorf. The «common Sort of ignorant People, and Idiots», he says 
-those who comprise «the greatest Part of Society»- are quite unable to manage such 
It was even doubted that there were any atheists on the grounds that no person who claimed to be an atheist 
could be trusted actually to be one, and especially since belief in God was thought unavoidable. it was clear 
the atheist was not telling the truth. As late as 1771 it was said that, while "Many people. both ancient and 
modem, have pretended to atheism ... it is justly questioned whether any man seriously adopted such a 
principie. These pretensions, therefore, must be founded on pnde or affectation". See "Atheist", in 
EncyclopaediaBrirant~ica; or, aDicri0nar.y ofAr.tsandSciet~ces, CompiledupotzaNewPlan, 3 vols. (Edinburgh: 
Be11 and Macfarquhar, 177 l), 1 : 501. For a helpful account of some seventeenth -and eighteenth- century 
attitudes towardatheismsee DavidBerman, "TheGenesis of Avowed AtheisiminBntain", Question, 11 (1978), 
44-45, and "The Repressive Denials of Atheism in Britain in the Seventeenth and Eighteenth Centuries", 
Proceedings of the Roya1 Irish Academy 82 (1982), 21 1-45. 
careful reflections. Consequently, to curb «the Violence of their Passions, and to 
outweigh Mens private Interests ... some more obvious Principles, which al1 the world 
may be sensible of, and which may make the deepest Impressions upon them, must be 
found out, and that, in a Word, can be no other than the Fear of a Deityn. It is, after all, 
only an outward appearance of morality that the atheist can manage: If the notions of 
honesty, for example, are cut off from any connection to the «Will of God, the supreme 
Lawgiver, the Author of our Being, the Protector of Mankind, and of Society)), they 
become «meer Chimera's ... barren Principles, pure Speculations, incapable of laying a 
Foundation for good Morality, orto produce solid Virtuen, while, Barbeyrac claims, it 
will simply never occur to the atheist that he should adhere to the principles of morality 
at the cost of his own desires and interests. (P 142,160) When al1 is said and done atheism 
can lead only to the destruction of society: 
The Notion of a GOD, and of an invisible Judge, who will punish Vice 
and reward Virtue, are naturally so fast linked together, that the most simple 
have a Sense of it, notwithstanding their other falce superstitious Idea's, as 
appears from the Example of the Pagans. But, as much as Atheism pleases 
some Men, as the more pure State, nothing but pernicious Consequences can 
be drawn from it, tending directly to the greatest Looseness and Debauchery; 
Consequences which are clear to the Sight of al1 the World, and can't but 
bring Destruction to a Society, which is composed of Men endowed with 
such irreligious Principles. (P 142) 
The voice of one person in particular was raised against these seventeenth-century 
attacks on atheists and atheism: that of Pierre Bayle, the author of Le Dictionnaire 
Historique et Critique. the work later viewed as the arsenal of the Enlightenment. 
Ironically, although he defended the morality of atheists, Bayle himself was very likely 
a believing Chnstian whose fideistic Calvinism was no hindrance to a plainspeaking 
criticism of cant and hypocrisy.12 
The event that tumed Bayle's attention to the issue of atheism and morality was the 
comet of 1680. In a world not far in time from pure Ptolemaicism, such a celestial event 
was thought by many to have special significance, to presage come great terrestrial event 
or events. Such opinions, Bayle argued, were little more than crude superstitions, and 
he buttressed his position with an analysis of causal relations that Hume must surely 
have appreciated. Here, however, we are concerned with the fact that Bayle's effort to 
overtum the view that comets are omens led him, as he says. to draw «aparallel between 
Atheism and Pagankm» and to enlist «whatever Logic and Historyx could provide in 
l 2  On Bayle in general see Elisabeth Labrousee. Pierre Bayle. Tome l. du pays de foix la cité d'Er.usme, 
and Plerre Bayle, Totne 2 ,  Herer.odoxie et rigoi.isme (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1963. 1964). On Bayle 
and the atheistcontroversy, see WalterE. Rex.Essays on Pier.1.e Bayle andReliglous Contr.over.sy (The Hague: 
Martinus Nijhoff, 1965), pp. 30-74. and especially 33-35, 51. J.-P. Pittion, "Hume's Reading of Bayle: An 
Inquiry into the Source andRoleof [Huine's] Memoranda". Journal oftheHistory ofPhilosophy, XV (1977). 
373-86, is also of interest here. 
order to defend his objections to, as it were, astrology. In the seque1 this parallel al1 but 
eclipsed the original concern.13 
Bayle's discussion proceeds diffusely, not unlike one of Montaigne's essays. 
Nevertheless, out of this diffusion there clearly emerges an argument. That argument 
attempts first to falsify, by an appeal to facts, the claims of the anti-atheists, and then to 
offer an alternative explanation of human behavior, an explanation that can account for 
the newly set-out facts. The result is a defense, but not a vindication, of atheism, in so 
far as it is shown that individual atheists have been (and thus can be) morally upright, 
and that there could be a society of atheists. 
There have been cornets, Bayle notes, from time immemorial, and comets that 
displayed themselves to pagan Europe before the Christian era began. It cannot be, then, 
that comets are always and necessarly a means by which God seeks to convert atheists 
to believers. For if comets were always intended to convert atheists to believers, then 
the pre-Christian comets must have been intended to convert atheists to idolatry, to a 
pagan religion. That cannot have been the case. Idolatry is as great an evil as is atheism, 
perhaps even a greater. Idolaters distort and demean the supernatural, picturing their 
gods as morally weak, even wicked; they revel in profane and heinous practices which 
they called sacred or religious; they enmesh themselves in groundless religious super- 
stitions, thereby closing their hearts and minds to the news of the one true Deity. God, 
who abhors al1 evil, would not send signs that could lead a generality of mankind into 
these profaning, shocking sins. God does not use his powers ir1 that way.14 
For that matter, Bayle goes on, experience of the world shows the fallaciousness of 
al1 reasonings intended to show that belief in God corrects the vicious inclinations of 
mankind. It is widely believed, of course, that man is a reasonable being, determined to 
desire happiness and avoid misery, and able to control his will by knowledge of what 
is the best means for achieving these ends. It is this belief, in fact, that underlies the view 
that atheism is «the most fearful Statex in which a man may be found. For supposing that 
man is a reasonable agent, and supposing further that individual men are «convinc'd 
there's a Providence ruling the World, from whom nothing is hid» and who «recom- 
penses the Vertuous with endless Felicity, and the Wicked with everlasting Pains,» it 
seems clearly to follow that the believer acts reasonably and well, while the unbeliever 
takes «Pleasures as his chief End, and Rule of al1 his Actions,» makes «Jest of what 
others cal1 Honor and Vertue.» and «perjures himself for a triflen. On this account the 
atheist must be «a Monster infinitely more dangerous than the wild Beasts, Lions, and 
furious Bulls, of which Hercules deliver'd Greece.» (B sect. 133) 
l 3  "Explanation I", The Dictionary Historrcal and Critica1 o f M r .  Perer Bayle. trans. by P. Des Maizeaux, 
et al. 5 vols.. 2d English edition (London: D. Midwinter, et al., 1734-1738). 5 :  811-14, especially 813. A 
convenient modem translation which includes this material is HistoricalandCriticalDictiotzary, ed. and trans. 
by R. H. Popkin (Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, 1965). 
l4  MiscellaneousReflections was fnstpublished as Penséesd~ver.sesécrites2 unDocieurdeSorbonne; Bayle 
later published a Continuation des Pensées diverses. 
This view is «al1 very fine andright,» says Bayle, «when one considers things in their 
Ideas and Metaphysical Abstracti0ns.x The difficulty is that the theory bears little 
resemblance to reality. Visitors from another world having heard about reasorzable 
Christians, believing in etemal paradise and torment, would doubtless infer that such a 
people spend their time in good works, and vie only to see who might excel in charity. 
The actual facts are immeasurably different, so much so that, were these visitors to «see 
only one Fortnight's way of the World,» they could not but conclude that the practice 
of Christians is not guided by the light of conscience. Christians employ «their utmost 
Skill, and al1 theirpassions, to perfect the Art of War»; their soldiers are no less barbaric 
than any others, as even the story of the crusades makes clear. Christian women are 
subject to the same carnal lusts as others; if some are allowed to remain chaste or 
virtuous, it is only at the expense of those many others who are encouraged in lewdness 
and prostitution. Chnstian gentlemen may go to church religiously enough, but out of 
church they whore and swear, duel and cheat, lie and devise ways «to second their filthy 
Desires.» There is no one with even a little experience of the world who does not know 
«a thousand Persons finnly persuaded of al1 the Miracles of Christianity ... [and] who yet 
live the most disorderly Lives.» If anything at al1 «be demonstrable in Morality,» Bayle 
says, «I doubt not I have demonstrated» that Christians can be «firmly persuaded of the 
Truth of their Religion,~ and yet live a sinful, immoral life, and hence «I conclude that 
Infidelity is not the source of a Corruption of Manners.» That corruption has quite 
another source. (B sects. 133-48, 159) 
Bayle's positive theory, if one may cal1 it that, is arelatively simple one. Christians, 
he has shown, do not live according to their pnnciples or opinions, nor does any other 
group act in accordance with its religious beliefs. Generally speaking, human actions are 
not guided by metaphysical principles, nor even by that most important of al1 principles, 
The Deity esists and concerns himselfwith human affairs. How else is one to explain 
the fact that there is «so prodigious a Diversity of Opinions conceming the manner of 
serving God, and the Forms of Civil Life,» while there is yet on the other hand a no less 
remarkable uniformity of human behavior? As Bayle puts it, «one finds the same 
Passions reign eternally in al1 ~oun t rys ,  and in al1 Ages,» that «Ambition, Avarice, 
Envy, Lust, Revenge, and al1 the Cnmes consequent on these Passions» are not merely 
common, but «rife al1 the World over,» and that «the Jew and Mahometan, Turk and 
Moor, the Christian and Infidel, Tartar and Indian, the Inhabitants on the Continent and 
those of the Isles, the Nobleman and the Yeoman, al1 kinds of Men, who differ in almost 
al1 things else, except the general Notion of Humanity ... so exactly agreex in their actions 
that one could easily think that they copied from one another. Such uniformity of 
behavior must spring from «the true Principle on Man's Actions,» his natural inclination 
for pleasure and his desires for particular things, or, in a word. from the passions 
themselves. Of course, Bayle adds, one must be careful in generalizing about man's 
motivations, for any rule will be subject to exceptions, but there is nonetheless a rule 
«which is for the most part true, to wit, That Man is not determin'd in his Actions by 
general Notices, or Views of his Understanding, but by the present reigning Passion of 
his Heart.» (B sects. 136, 138) 
There is, then, no reason to have a special fear of atheists, to suppose either that they 
must necessarily be more immoral than other men, or that they are less able to participate 
in society. If it is generally true, «as History and common Life» show, that mankind runs 
headlong into al1 kinds of sin, while yet believing this fundamental proposition of 
religion: «that there's a God who terribly repays the Sinner, and duly rewards the Good,» 
then those that say that belief in this fundamental proposition is a guarantee that the 
believer will lead a good life are clearly mistaken. Consequently, it is a mistake to 
suppose that because a man is a believer (either a Christian or an idolater) he will live 
«a better moral Life than an Atheist.» Atheists are motivated by the same principles that 
motivate idolaters, and both are motivated in exactly the same way that Christians are 
motivated: by the passions. If every «malicious Inclination results from the Ground of 
Human Nature, and is fortify'd by the Passions; which nsing in the very Mass of our 
Blood, are infinitely diversify'd according to the different Accidents of Life,» then the 
«Inclination to do ill, belongs no more to a Heart void of the Sense of God, than [to] one 
possess'd with it. Furthermore, any inclinations we may have to upright behavior - 
sobriety, good nature, honesty, pity- are owing not to any supposition we may have 
formed conceming the existence of a Deity, but to our «particular natural Temper and 
Cosntitution, fortify 'd by Education, by Self-love, Vain-glory, an Instinct of Reason, or 
such-like Motives, «and these» prevail in Atheists as well as others. There's no ground 
then to maintain, that an Atheist must neccessarily be more inordinate than an Idolater.» 
(B sect. 145) 
One is not surprised, then, when Bayle writes: 
1 make no scruple to declare, wou'd you know my Thoughts of a 
Commonwealth of Atheists, That as to Manners and Civil Life 'twou'd 
exactly resemble a Commonwealth of Pagans; 'twill indeed require very 
severe Laws, and very executed. But do's not every State require the Same? 
That he then goes on to suggest that it is merely because the King of France has given 
a new force to the «Laws against Bullys and Pickpockets» that there has been a decrease 
in street crime in Paris makes it clearenough that Bayle thinks a society of atheists vould 
also match a society of Christians, or at least match that of His Most Christian Majesty. 
There does not happen to be a society of atheists, and perhaps there never has been one. 
But were there such a society it is probable, Bayle concludes, that it would: 
observe al1 Civil and Moral Dutys, as other Societys do, provided Crimes 
were severely punish'd, and Honor and Infamy annex'd to certain Points. As 
the Ignorance of a first Being, the Creator and Presen~er of the World, wou'd 
not bereave the Members of this Society of a sense of Glory and Contempt, 
Reward and Punishment, or of al1 the Passions which reign in teh rest of Men, 
nor wholly extinguish the Lightof Reason; one shou'd findpersons among'em 
of Integnty in coinmon dealing, some who reliev'd the Poor, oppos'd 
Violence, were faithful to their Friends. despis'd Injurys, renounc'd sensual 
Pleasures, did no wrong; prompted to these worthy Actions, either by a love 
of Praise inseparable from'em, ora design of gaining Friends and Welwishers 
in case of a tum in their own Fortune. The Women wou'd set up for Vertue, 
as an infallible Pledg of the mens Love and Esteem. Crimes indeed of al1 
kinds must happen in such a Society; but not frequenter than in a Society of 
Idolaters, because al1 the Principles which prompted the Pagans to Good or 
Evil, Rewards and Punishments, Glory and Disgrace, Complexion and 
Custom, take place in a Society of Atheists. (B sect. 172) 
Hume met head-on the challenge of the anti-atheists, and in doing so carried the defense 
of atheism to new levels. But before we tum to Hume some terminological clanficacions 
will give us a better appreciation of this challenge and of Hume's atheistic response. 
The first thing to note is that early modern usage of the terms atheism and atheist 
were somewhat different, and considerably broader, than current usage appears to be. 
In the earlier time these terms expressed, as often as not, a kind of general opprobium 
-they were epithets used to denounce the heterodox as well as the unbeliever, as is 
made clear by the fact that Erasmus, Luther, Calvin, and severa1 renaissance popes were 
among those who were said to be atheists and who were denounced for their atheism. 
Secondly, early modern writers distinguished between practica1 and speculatiije 
atheists. Practica1 atheists were generally considered the less dangerous species for they 
simply, by their profligate behavior, acted as though there were no God ready to judge 
and to punish their misdeeds. Such callousness was by 110 mean good, but it was thought 
to be considerably less insidious, less dangerous, than even the most circumspect 
theorizing of the speculative atheist.15 Thirdly, we should bear in mind the position 
reported by Thomas Stanley in his seventeenth-century history of philosophy: the term 
atheist, he says, may be «taken two ways»: If may refer to «him who is an enemy to the 
Gods.»16 It will be seen that on each of these three uses one can be an atheist without 
making an outright denial of the existence of a god or gods, while on the third use of the 
term, the class of atheists is seen to include those individuals who are opposed to the 
gods, or those we might cal1 a-theists: individuals who are opposed to the gods or who 
indicate that they can manage quite well, thank you, without a god or gods. 
l 5  On these uses of atheist and urheism see D. C. Allen, Doubt's Boundless Sea (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins 
University Press, 1964). Stanley's use of the termcomesfrom his account of Pyrrhonism ans iscited herefrom 
the entry for atheist in the OED. 
l6 Bentley's first Boyle Lecture (see above, n. 4) characterizes atheism as including "al1 the various Forms 
of Impiety; whether of such as excludes the Deity from goveming the World by his Providence, or judging 
it by his Righteousness, or creating it by his Wisdom and Power ... [and those] that no only disbelieve the 
Christian Religion; but irnpugn the assertion of aprovidence, of theInzmor.tulicj of the Soul, of an Universal 
Judgement to come, and of any Incorporeal Essence". Al1 these views terminate. he says, "in downright 
Atheism. For the Divine Inspection into the affairs of the World doth necessarily follow from the Nature and 
Being of God. And he that denies this, doth implicitly deny his Existence ... the Existence of God and his 
Govemment of the World do mutally suppose and imply one another". (pp. 5-6) The Boyle Lecturer of 1697, 
Francis Gastrell, gives much the same analysis: The atheist is one who "says there is no God that govems the 
world, and judgeth the earth; there is no God that has appointed laws and rules formen to act by; there is no 
God to whom men are accountable for their actions". The Cerrainiy and  N e c e s s i ~  ofReligion ir1 general ... 
(London, 1697). Cited from John Redwood, Reason, Ridicule and Religion: The Age of Enlightenment in 
England, 1660-1 750, (Carnbridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1976), p. 30. Redwood's work is a useful 
compendium of materials on the atheist controversy 
This third and philosophically significant understanding of atheism is fundamental 
to the controversy reviewed above. We have seen, of course, that atheist and atheism 
were used in highly charged ways, and that it was mainly speculative atheism that 
concerned Bentley, Pufendorf, Barbeyrac and their contemporaries. Even more impor- 
tantly, however, we find speculative atheism being given, by our own standards, a broad 
but reasonably clear definition. A (speculative) atheist is aperson who maintains, in one 
form or another, the truth (or perhaps merely the likelihood) of any one of the following 
propositions: 
l .  There is no God, no intelligent first cause of the universe. 
2. There is or may be a God, but he takes no interest in the affairs of the universe; there 
is or may be a Deity, but there is no Divine Providence that guides the affairs of man. 
3. Humans have no irnmortal soul, and hence there are no eterna1 and divine rewards 
or punishments; the human soul has, in effect, impunity. 
It is to the man who fits this description of the atheist that the anti-atheists, here most 
fully represented by Pufendorf and Barbeyrac, make their challenge. That challenge in 
a general form is unambiguously articulated by Pufendorf, while a more specific and 
rather different sounding challenge (but one that comes to much the same thing) is 
enunciated by Barbeyrac. 
For in as much as the whole Race of Men in al1 Ages have constantly held 
this Persuasion [of God's existence], whoever would attempt to assert the 
contrary, must of Necessity, not only solidly confute al1 the Arguments 
produced on the other side, but also alledge better and more plausible 
Reasons for his own particular Opinion. And farther, since the Safety and 
Happiness of Mankind have been hitherto thought to depend chiefly on this 
Belief, it is requisite, that he likewise prove Atheism to contribute more to the 
Interest and the Good of al1 Men, than the Acknowledgement of a Deity. (P 254) 
It is certain, that Morality is the Daughter of Religion, that they go hand 
in hand together; and that the Pe-fection of the latter, is the Standard of 
Perfection in the former ... In Fact, the fundamental Principles of Natural 
Religion, whichmust be the Basis of al1 other Religion; are also the mostfirm, 
or rather only, Foundation of this Science of Morality. 
Without a Deity, Duty, Obligation, Right, are no more, to say the Truth, 
than fine Ideas; which may please the Mind, but can scarce touch the Heart; 
and which of themselves, cannot impose an indispensible Necessity to actor 
not to act, in such or such a certain manner ... But to give these Ideas their full 
Force and due measure of Efficacy; to make 'em strong enough to maintain 
their Ground against Passion and Self-interest; they will require a supenour 
Being; a Being supenour to us in Power and Might, who has subjected us to 
a strict Conformity therewith in our Conduct; who has bound us thereto ... 
who has put us under an Obligation, properly so call'd ... This Fear of a Deity, 
who punishes Vice and rewards Virtue, has so great an Efficacy; that, altho' 
the fundamental Principles of Religion be much darken'd, by the Intermix- 
ture of 'Errour and Superstition; yet if they are not entirely corrupted and 
destroy 'd, it will still continue to actuate, and have aconsiderable influence ... 
But shou'd you make the finest System in the World, if Religion has not its 
part in it, it will be little more than (as 1 may say) a speculative Morality; and 
you will be found to build on a sandy Foundation. (P Hist. Account 14-15) 
More than one Hume scholar has argued that Hume's religious position was 
misunderstood by his contemporary critics and their nineteenth-century successors, a 
great majonty of whom thought Hume a religious scepticpar excellence, an atheist.17 
If atheist is used in only a strict present-day sense, to refer to a person who explicitly 
denies the existence of a god or gods, one could conclude that Hume was notan atheist, 
for we have, so far as 1 know, no record of such an outright denial. 1 suggest, however, 
that such a conclusion is anachronistic and seriously misleading; by the standards of his 
contemporaries Hume was indeed an atheist. As we have already seen, explicitly 
denying the existence of the deity was nota necessary qualification of the early modern 
atheist, while on the other tests of atheism set by the anti-atheists of his time, Hume 
scores impressively: 
1. Hume clearly, explicitly attacked the notion that there is a deity who takes an 
interest in human affairs, the notion, that is, that there is some significant form of divine 
providence. He argues that the very concept of a miracle is incoherent and, even if that 
were not so, the evidence in favor of any purported miracle is inadequate to establish that 
a divine intervention has takenplace. Such evidence is not only suspect, but congenitally 
so. In addition, the world or the universe itself, commonly alleged to bespeak an 
intelligent, concerned creator, presents us with amixed bag of evidence, with evil as well 
as good, so that the argument from design fails for lack of a compelling major premise. 
If the minor premise is not equally suspect, the very form of this so-called argument is, 
for itpurports to carry us beyond the suggestion that the effects we experience have some 
cause, to a very different conclusion, namely, that these effects are the consequences of 
an omniscient, omnipotent, omnibenevolent creator.18 
2. Hume allowed to the idea of god only the absolute minimum of content. Assuming 
that Philo of the Dialogues speaks for him, Hume can be so expansive as to say that we 
should give a "plain, philosophical assent" to "one simple, thought somewhat ambigu- 
ous, at least undefined proposition, that the cause or causes of order in the universe 
probably bear some remote analogy to human intelligence". (D 227) In a less expansive 
mood, and clearly speaking for himself, Hume argued that the origin of the idea of god 
lies in the ignorarice and fear of primitive man and that from this natural beginning we 
l 7  Among those wlio appear to believe that Hume's religious position was correctly assessed by his 
contemporaries are David Berman and John Gaskin. See Berman's "David Hume and the Supression of 
'Atheism"', Joilrnul ofilieHisrory ofPh11osopiiy 21 (1983), 375-87; andGaskin'sHu»~eSPliilosopl~~ofRelig~oti, 
(London: Macmillan, 1978). Professor Gaskin's study is the most complete account of Hume's philosophy of 
religion, and one to vhich 1 am indebted. 1 have also learned from his "Hume, Atheism, and the'lnterested 
Obligatiori' of Morality ", in ~LlcGill Hurne Sri~dies, ed. D.F. Xorton, N. Capaldi and W. Robinson (San Diego: 
Austin Hill Press: 1978), 147-60) 
l8 See Hume's Enquii:)~ concerning Humun Understariding. Sections X and XI, and his Dialogues ton- 
cerning Alut~~rul Reliqion, pussim. 
have added and subtracted characteristics extracted from one human source or another, 
and augmented these by the addition of that most incomprehensible of al1 philosophical 
concepts, the infinite.19 Given the lack of irreducible religious content in even the most 
sublime form of the idea of the deity, one might suppose that Hume had no real reason 
to make an outright denial of the existence of a deity or d e i t i e ~ . ~ ~  
3. Hume explicitly attacked what he took to be the strongest arguments favoring 
belief in the immortality of the soul, and he gave a clear and unequivocal testimony of 
his belief in his own mortality. After reviewing the kinds of arguments available to prove 
the immortality of the soul, Hume concludes that the matter is quite beyond the range 
of effective argumentation: "By what arguments or analogies can we prove any state of 
existence, which no one ever saw, and which no way resembles any that ever was seen? 
Who will repose such trust in any pretended philosophy, as to admit upon its testimony 
the reality of so marvellous a scene? Some new species of logic is requisite for that 
purpose; and some new faculties of the mind, that they may enable us to comprehend 
that l o g i ~ " . ~ l  This remark does leave open the possibility that, as an act of faith, Hume 
nonetheless believed in personal immortality. We can thank James Boswell, however, 
for closing out that issue by asking Hume, when the latter was obviously on his deathbed, 
"if it was not possible that there might be a future state". To this question Hume 
responded by saying that "it was a most unreasonable fancy that he should exist for 
e ~ e r " . ~ ~  
There is more. Hume was not content with a quiet, even affable. criticism of theism. 
He was also an active, aggressive enemy of the gods. an enemy who met the anti- 
atheistical challenge head-on by arguing that the theists have it precisely backward: 
Religion does not make morality possible; religion rnakes morality impossible. 
Wherever it exists -and it defies extermination- religion corrupts morality. There is 
not space here to review even briefly the lifetime of works on which Hume made this 
point, but it can be safely said that from the publication of Essays Moral and Political 
in 1741 to the posthumous publication of the Dialogues concerning Natural Religion 
in 1779, no major work by Hume failed toprobe critically some aspect of religious belief 
or religious practice, and more often than not, his attention was drawn to the morally 
corrupting effects of r e l ig i~n . '~  
l9 NHR 3: 309-63. This work is discussed below. 
20 Hume does grant that the belief in a deity cannot be eradicated entirely from the human race, and not even 
from most individuals. But given his views about the corrigibility of human belief, even of those beliefs that 
21 
"Of the Immortality of the Soul", W 4: 405-06. 
22 For Boswell's account of his July 7. 1776 interview with Hume. see D 76-80. 
23 It has often been noted that Hume reported to Henry Home (later Lord Kames) that he was "castrating" 
the TI-eatise of its nobler parts, or those dealing with religious issues, and likely to offend. Not so often noticed 
are his remarks to Francis Hutcheson, two years later, indicating that Book 111 of the Trearise \vas subjected 
to a similar round of revisions so as not to give offense to the religious. See The Leirers ofDavid Hume. ed. 
J .  Y .  T. Greig, 2 vols. (Oxford: The Clarendon Press, 1932), 1. 34, 36 (letters 13 and 15). Had not Hume so 
carefully altered the Treatise, it too, it seems safe to say, would be more explicitly critica1 of religious beliefs 
and practices. 
Man, Hume goes on, is perpetually suspended between "life and death, health and 
sickness, plenty and want", conditions that are "distributed amongst the human 
species by secret and unknown causes". In this condition we focus on these unknown 
causes, and while they are the object of our hopes and fears, while our passions keep 
us in a state of constant alarm, our imagination forms for us ideas of those powers on 
which we seem to depend. Were we able at this point to dissect each part of nature as 
the best natural philosophy can now do, we would no doubt find that these unknown 
and awesome causes are merely the "particular fabric and structure" of ourselves or 
nature. Lacking that hard-won skill, the ignorant multitude muddles on, and consistent 
with a "universal tendency" of our nature, they personify these causes. It is not only in 
the moon or clouds that mankind find faces or other human shapes. The secret and 
unknown causes that we fear come in for the same treatment; they are given "thought 
and reason and passion, and sometimes even the limbs and figures of men". (NHR 111; 
W 4: 3 1 6 - 1 7 ) ~ ~  
From fear, polytheism; from fear and polytheism, theism. It was the disorder of their 
circumstances that led primitive men to a belief in deities, and it is disorder that leads 
the current multitude to believe in a supreme and particular providence. Not even the 
masses of modern Europe are brought to their religious opinions by any process of 
rational argument. They, like their ancestors, base these opinions upon "irrational and 
superstitious principles", and it is precisely these principles that transform polytheism 
into theism. (NHR VI; W 4: 328-30) 
An idolatrous people, although they recognize severa1 deities, will often, nonethe- 
less, see one of these as superior to the rest. When this happens, the worship of this 
apparently superior deity will take exaggerated and flattering forms, and 
as men's fears or distresses become more urgent, they still invent new 
straims of adulation; and even he who outdoes his predecesor in swelling up 
the titles of his divinity, is sure to be outdone by his successor in newer and 
more pompous epithets of praise. Thus they proceed; ti11 at last they arrive at 
infinity itself ... 
Of course it is unlikely that the masses understand the increasingly sublime attributes 
that are ascribed to the supreme deity, but "thinking it safest to comply with the higher 
encomiums, they endeavour, by an affected ravishment and devotion, to ingratiate 
themselves with him". By this entirely natural and unmysterious process, then, does the 
fundamental belief of the theist arise. (NHR VI, VII; W 4: 330-33) 
25 .'They suppose their deities. however potent and invisible, to be nothing but a species of human creatures, 
perhaps raised from among mankind, and retaining al1 human passions and appetites, together with corporeal 
limbs and organs. Such limited beings, though masters of human fate, being, each of theni, incapable of 
extending his influence every where, must be vastly multiplied, in order to answer that variety of events, which 
happen over the whole face of nature. Thus every place is stored with a crowd of local deities: and thus 
polytheism has prevailed, and still prevails, among the greatest part of uninstructed mankind ... every 
disastrous accident alarms us, and sets us on enquiries conceming the principles whence it arose: Apprehen- 
sions spring up with regard to futurity: And the mind, sunk into diffidence, terror, and melancholy, has 
recourse to every methodof appeasing those secret intelligent powers. on whom our future is supposedentirely 
to depend". (NHR 111; W 4: 3 18-19) 
But, although the origin of theism can be traced to polytheism, and though either of 
these two forms of religion may gradually be transformed into the other, it does not 
follow that there are no genuinely important differences between theism and polythe- 
ism. Sections IX-XII of the Naíural History offer a comparison of polytheism and 
monotheism with regard to persecution and toleration, courage and abasement, reason 
or absurdity, and doubt or conviction. 
Polytheism, Hume argues, has the disadvantage of appearing so flexible in its tenets 
that there is no practice or opinion that it could not support; on the other hand it has the 
advantage that it is, by its very nature, highly tolerant of diversity. Theism has the 
contrary advantages and disadvantages, but appears to come off a poor second just 
because of its natural tendency toward intolerance. It should set before mankind "the 
most illustrious example, as well as the most commanding motives, of justice and 
benevolence. "It is more likely to set a bad example as its sects" fa11 naturally into 
animosity, and mutually discharge on each other that sacred zeal and rancour, the most 
furious and impacable of al1 human passions".26 Theism, because it represents the deity 
as infinitely superior to mankind and is at the same time joined with "superstitious 
terrors", is likely "to sink the human mind into the lowest submission and abasement, 
and to represent the monkish virtues of mortification, penance, humility, and passive 
suffering, as the only qualities which are acceptable" to the Deity. The deities of 
polytheism, in contrast, are so little different from ourselves that we are offered the 
prospect of emulating, even rivalling, them, and consequently "activity, spirit, courage, 
magnanimity, love of liberty, and, al1 the virtues" that make a people greater are 
encouraged. (NHR IX; W 4:336-39) 
A fair examination of ancient polytheism, Hume goes on, will reveal that this 
religion is not so absurd as one might at first suppose. It is only the view that, whatever 
powers or principles formed the world that we inhabit, these powers also produced "a 
species of intelligent creatures of more refined substance and greater authority than the 
rest". Indeed, "the whole mythological system is so natural" that it seems more than 
likely to have been instantiaded somewhere in the universe. Theism, in contrast, seems 
at first so reasonable that philosophy itself is joined with theology -with disastrous 
consequences. For philosophy finds herself 
very unequally yoked with her new associate; and instead of regulating 
each principle, as they advance together, she is at every turn perverted to 
serve the purposes of superstition ... one may safely affirm, that al1 popular 
theology, especially the scholastic, has a kind of appetite for absurdity and 
contradiction. If that theology went not beyond reason and common sense, 
her doctrines would appear too easy and familiar. Amazement must of 
necessity be raised: Mystery affected: Darkness and obscurity sought after: 
26 '.The intolerance of almost al1 religions, which have maintained the unity of God, is as remarkable as the 
contrary principle of the polytheists ... 1 mal) venture to affirm. that few cormptions of idolatry and polytheism 
are more pernicious to society than this corruption of theism. when carried to the utmost height". (NHR IX; 
W 4: 337-38) 
And a foundation of merit afforded to the devout votanes, who desire an 
opportunity of sudduing their rebellious reason, by the belief of the most 
unintelligible sophisms. (NHR XI; W 4:341-4212' 
On each point of comparison, then, Hume finds polytheism superior to monotheism. 
In view of this finding, it is al1 the more significant that he has already argued that 
polytheism is, when al1 is said and done, a form of atheism. There is, Hume had argued, 
only a relatively small and insignificant difference between the atheist who says there 
is no "invisible, intelligent power in the world", and the polythiest who posits a bevy of 
deities practically indistinguishable from such quasi-material beings as elves and 
fairies. In contrast, the difference between the polytheist and the genuine theist is 
enormous, despite the fact that our language leads us to treat the two positions as similar. 
It is "as fallacy", Hume writes, "merely from the casual resemblance of names, without 
and conformity of meaning, to rank such opposite opinions under the same denomina- 
tion". And he goes on to conclude that 
These pretended religionists [the polytheists] are really a kind of super- 
stitious atheists, and acknowledge no being, that corresponds to our idea of 
a deity. No first pnnciple of mind or thought: NO supreme govemment and 
administration: No divine contrivance or intention in the fabric of the world. 
(NHR IV; W 4 : 3 2 0 ) ~ ~  
In short, Hume finds that so far as severa1 crucial social virtues are concerned, 
polytheism is demonstrably superior to monotheism, while in general the morals of 
polytheists are necessarily less corrupt than those of the theistsZ9 But if polytheism is 
27 "To oppose the torrent of scholastic religion by such feeble maxims as these, that ~t ir i~nporsihle for the 
same tizing to be utzd not to be, that the whole is greater than apart,  that hvo and three makefive; is pretending 
to stop the ocean with a bull-rush. Will you set up profane reason against sacred mystery? No punishmerit is 
great enough for your impiety. And the same fires, which were kindled for heretics. will also serve for ttie 
destruction of philosophers". (NHR XI; W 4: 342) 
28 Hume closes Section IV by remarking : "It 1s great complaisance, indeed, if we dignify with the name of 
religion such an imperfect system of theology, and put it on leve1 with later systems. which are founded on 
principles more just and more sublime. For my part, 1 can scarcely allow the principles even of Marcus 
Aurelius, Plutarch and some other Stolcs and Academlcs, though much more refined than the pagan super- 
stition. to be worthy of the honourable appellation of theism. For if the mythology of the heathens resemble 
the ancient European systern of spiritual beings, excluding God and angels, and leaving only fairies and 
spnghts; the creed of these philosophers may justly be said to exclude a deity; and to leave only angels arid 
f@ries3'. (NHR IV; W 4: 325) 
2y Monotheism leads necessarily to greater corruption just because it achieves the higher and purer theory. 
Whilc the supposed exterit of the deity's "science and authority" increases, so do our "teriors naturally 
augment"; the "higher the deity is exalted in power and knowledge, the lower of course is he depressed in 
goodness and belevolence; whatever epithets of praise may be bestowed on him by his amazed adorers". It 
is this conflict, Hume goes on to suggest, which is responsible for the unhealthy mental state of many theists: 
their opinion itself, he says, "contracts a kind of falsehood, and belies the inward sentiment. The h e m  secretly 
destests such measures of cruel and implacable vengeance: but the judgement dares not but pronounce them 
perfect and adorable. And the additional rnisery of this inward struggle aggravates al1 the other terrors. by 
which these unhappy victims to superstition are for ever haunted". (NHR XII; W 4: 354-55) 
morally supenor to monotheism, and yet polytheism and atheism are essentially one and 
the same, then one can equally well conclude that atheism is morally supenor to 
monotheism. Whether one agrees or disagrees with Hume's conclusion, one must grant 
that he has challenged head-on the claim that religion, and speciallly theism, provides 
the foundation of morality and the cement of ~ o c i e t y . ~ ~  
As represented by Pufendorf and Barbeyrac, the anti-atheists can be seen to have 
presented four principal challenges to the atheist: 
1. Given the nearly perfect universality of belief in a providential deity, the atheist 
is challenged to confute the arguments that support this belief. 
2. The atheist is then challenged to show that his own position is supported by "better 
and more plausible" arguments than is the theistic position he has confuted. 
3. Given the nearly perfect universality of the opinion that religious belief is the 
cement of society, the atheist is challenged to show that atheism contributes "more to 
the Interest and Good of al1 Men, than [does] the acknowledgment of a Deity". 
4. The atheist is then challenged to show that there can be an effective, practica1 
morality that is independent of religious belief. 
The greater part of Hume's response to this four-part challenge is well-known. None 
of his philosophical writings is more familiar than those in which he attempted to 
overturn the arguments purporting to prove the existence of a providential deity. These 
same arguments gave Hume grounds for claiming that his sceptical position is in fact 
more plausible than that of the theists, while the Natural History of Religion presents 
his thoroughly naturalistic candidate for the most plausible and compelling account of 
the origin of religion. Andas we have just seen, Hume set out to rebut the theists' claim 
that religious belief is the cement of society. Religion, Hume argues, is in fact a grave 
danger to society. 
It comes as no surprise, then, to find Hume meeting the fourth of the anti-atheist' 
challenges. He did so by developing a "system of  moral^"^' that derives both moral 
distictions and moral motivation from an entirely secular foundation, and that at the 
same time offers arguments and analyses which, if correct, entirely overturn the 
fundamental assumptions of those theistic moralists who claim that morality is founded 
on certain divine commands. 
The divine command theory of morality presupposes the truth of a number of 
c l a i m ~ . ~ ~  Those who. believe that the only satisfactory account of morality is one that 
30 Bayle had found it necessary to grant that his argument in suppori of atheists was hypothetical only, for 
there was no known society of atheists to holdup as evidence. Hume, by identifiying polytheism with atheism, 
avoids this problem and strengthens the atheistic position. 
31 T 574; see also p. 618, where Hume speaks of his '.system of ethics". 
32 The theory 1 am discussing is perhaps more commonly called voluntarism, but, because some versions 
of voluntarism may not contain precisely the elements found in Pufendorf, Barbeyrac, etc., 1 have retained 
the more idiosyncratic term, divine command t h e o q .  Several of the presuppositions mentioned are espoused 
explicitly by Barbeyrac in his notes to Book 11, chap. IV of Pufendorf's Of the Law of Nature and Nations, 
where the latter's popular Abridgement of the Duties of a Man and Citiíen, giving "us a System of natural 
Religion; i. e. the Duties of Man to God", is summarized. See pp. 155 ff. Note also Locke's remark in MS. 
C28, cited in the note 8. 
traces its origins to divine commands must also believe that there is a being who, by 
virtue of (among other things) creating rnankind, or controlling the destiny of mankind, 
is clearly superior to rnankind. This superior or supreme being rnust also be a rnorally 
superior being -a being whose every activity is necessarily v i r t u ~ u s . ~ ~  Also, he must 
be known to take an interest in the affairs and beha\lior of mankind, and he must 
dernonstrate this interest in hurnan affairs by establishing and prornulgating rules or 
laws (divine cornmands) that are intended to direct the behavior of rational beings and 
especially to direct the behavior of individual rnernbers of the hurnan race. On the other 
hand, the creatures whose behavior is to be directed by these cornmands rnust be rational 
beings capable of understanding the cornrnands given them. 
In addition, the divine command theory presupposes the truth of at least three other 
fundamental propositions: 
A. Inferior and dependent individuals owe an alleagiance to the superior being on 
whorn they depend. 
B. Virtue, at least for inferior individuals, consists in conforrning one's behavior to 
rules or laws, while the suprerne being rewards those who conform to the divine 
cornmands, and punishes those who do not; these rewards and punishments include 
those adrninistered in an eterna1 extension of this life. 
C. Without the sanctions provided by the fear of eternal punishment or the hope of 
eternal reward, one can only understand a divine command; it is the sanctions, and 
especially that of fear, that give one the required desire to conform one's actions to the 
cornmand. 
Hurne's moral theory, especially that of the Treatise, is a concerted attack on these 
fundamental presupposition.34 The anti-atheists challenged the atheist to show that 
there can be an effective, practica1 morality independent of religious belief. In the rnost 
general terms: Hume's response to this challenge rnay be understood as a rnodified tu 
quoque argurnent: Pufendorf and Barbeyrac clairn that the atheistic rnoralist can at best 
account for no more than the occurrence of barren, merely speculative moral concepts. 
Hume in response argues that the anti-atheists' theory of rnorals is a patchwork of 
superstition and authority that fails of even so meagre an accornplishrnent as the one 
mentioned. The anti-atheists thernselves fail to account for even the bare attainrnent of 
such basic moral concepts as duty, obligation, allegiunce, justice, or propertj, nor, on 
their principles, could they ever give such an account. Furthermore, they have com- 
pletely rnisunderstood both the nature and foundations of rnorality, and they have 
33 It has been suggested to me that this puts the matter too strongly. for to say that every activity of the deity 
is necessarily virtuous is to suggest a limitation on his activity not in accord with the views of the voluntarists. 
It appears, however, that the deity of even the most radical voluntarist is necessarily virtuous in every actioii. 
for, according to the voluntarist, the actions or commands of the deity define virtue: actions are good or riglit 
because the deity orders them or performs them. 
34 A further such presupposition which Hume can be seeri to oppose is the view that understanding the law 
of the superior being on which one is dependent imposes on one the obligation to obey that law (in virtue, 
apparently, of the allegiance owed the superior being). Hume's objections to attempts to found morality on 
understanding alone are well kno~vn,  and hence 1 shall here omit any discussion of his seasons for rejecting 
this particular presupposition, but my views on the subject are set out in chapter 3 of my DuvidH~inie .  
mistakenly conflated acting virtuously, or the acquisition of moral ment, with devo- 
tional acts, or the acquisition of religious merit. 
Let me begin with the last of these suggestions. Here again we can draw on the 
Natural Histoty of Religion and Hume's suggestions about the foundation of religious 
practice in human nature. 
Suppose, Hume says, someone founded a popular religion3' in which it were "ex- 
pressly declared" that nothing but virtuous behaviour could gain the approbation of the 
deity, and even that this religion were served by an order of priests or clerics themselves 
entirely satisfied to do nothing more than to teach this opinion through daily sermons. 
So "inveterate are the people's prejudices". he continues, "that, for want of some other 
superstition, they would make the very attendance on these sermons the essentials of 
religion", thus substituting certain ntualistic acts for those of genuine virtue. The 
difficulty is, it seems, that men simply cannot bring themselves to accept that the best 
means of serving the deity is "by promoting the happiness of his creatures". On the 
contrary, because of the terrors with which they are haunted, men "seek the divine favor, 
not by virtue and good morals, which alone can be acceptable to a perfect being, but 
either by frivolous observances, by intemperate zeal, by rapturous extasies, or by the 
belief of mysterious and absurd opinions". That is, religion leads mankind to eschew the 
practice of virtue, and in its stead take up one or another practice "which either serves 
to nopurpose in life, or offers the strongest violence to [man's] natural inclinations". Just 
because the practice is useless it is thought to be the "more purely religious". What, after 
all, could be a surer proof of devotion than to perform austere and bizarre acts that can 
have no purpose other than the expression of this very devotion. 
Two features of Hume's view emerge from these remarks. First, the practice of 
religion and the practice of virtue run along paths not merely separate but entirely 
divergent. Religious acts are motivated out of self-interest, and for that very reason 
cannot be acts of virtue. Virtuous acts are those done out of regard for the interests of 
others. But aman  who courts divine favor in order to secure "protection and safety in 
this world, and eterna1 happiness in the next", is not virtuous, but selfish. In this regard, 
the divine command theory, as Shaftesbury and Hutcheson had already noticed, is no 
significant improvement on the selfish theory Hume attributes to Thomas ~ o b b e s . ~ ~  
The practice of religion does itself lead men to neglect, even to repudiate, the practice 
of virtue. Furthermore, in his concern to distinguish himself before his deity, in his 
35 By popular religion Hume sirnply means a religion of the people, in contrast to one lirnited to only a few 
philosophers. 
36 For a brief account od Shaftesbury 's objections to Locke and other Christian rnoralists, see Dai~dHi ime ,  
pp. 33-43. For Hutcheson's views of Pufendorf. see the remarks referred to above, note 8: for a discussion 
of his objections to Locke's ethics, see my "Hutcheson's Moral Realism". Journal of the History of Piii- 
losophj,  22 (July, 1985), 397-418. Bayle appears to have influenced both Shaftesbury (with whom he was 
personally well acquainted) and Hutcheson on the matter of the morality of atheists, while Hume, as is well 
known. acknowledges the influence of these two British moralists. Hume goes further than either Shaftesbury 
or Hutcheson, however, who are generally content to argue that atheists could be morally upnght. See 
Shaftesbury's An Inquily concerning Virtite. oi.iMerit. Book 1. Part 111, and Hutcheson's lllustrutions iipon 
rhe iMora1 Sense, Section VI. v-vii. 
concern to focus the divine attention upon himself, the religious man far too often 
succumbs to the temptation to commit what are nothing less than immoral acts: 
the greatest crimes have been found, in many instances, [to be] compat- 
ible with a superstitious piety and devotion: Hence, it is justly regarded as 
unsafe to draw any certain inference in favour of a man's morals, from the 
fervour or strictness of his religious exercises, even though he himself 
believe them sincere. (NHR XIV; W 4: 357-59)37 
These general considerations can serve as background to a necessanly brief sketch 
of Hume's responses to each of the three presuppositions, A, B and C. 
C. Without the sanctions provided by the fear of eternal punishment or the hope of 
eternal reward, one can only understand a divine command; it is the sanchons, and espe- 
cially that of fea,  that give one the required desire to conform one's actions to the cornmand. 
Just above 1 noted that Hume rejects the claim that fear may be the motive to virtue. 
This can be amplified in at least two ways. First, Hume rejects a further suggestion of 
the divine command theory, namely, the claim that we are motivated only by self- 
interest. In this respect, Hume's criticisms of Hobbes, Locke and Mandeville serve a 
double role, as does his own (so he believed) fuller and more accurate account of human 
n a t ~ r e . ~ ~  The overall effect is to show that fear is far from being the only passion capable 
of motivating us to action. That is, Hume surveys human nature and human behavior and 
concludes that we are in fact motivated by a number of passions, including a limited but 
entirely natural (instinctive, uninstructured) generosity. Consequently, these is no 
reason to suppose that it is only by adding fear to the mixture that men can be motivated 
to keep rules or (what is not the same thing) to act virtuously. Even if, contrary to fact, 
virtue could be motivated by fear, it would not necessarily be motivated by fear. Men 
are motivated by severa1 passions other than fear, and consequently morality need not 
be supposed to be dependent upon whatever it is that is said to be attained -motivation 
os sanction- by positing a divine and threatening l a ~ ~ i v e r . ~ ~  
37 Boswell reports of Hume (on his death bed): "He then said flatly that the Morality of every Religion was 
bad, and, 1 really thought, was notjocular when he said, 'that when he heard aman was religious, he concluded 
he was a rascal, though he had known some instances of very good men being religious"'. Boswell then adds, 
significantly: "This was just an extravagant reverse of the common remark as to Infidels". (D 76) 
38 Hobbes and Locke, Hume writes "maintained the selfish system of morals". He then adds: "The most 
obvious objection to the selfish hypothesis is, that, as it is contrary to common feeling and our most 
unprejudiced notions, there is required the highest suetch of philosophy to establish so extraordinary a 
paradox. To the most careless observer there appear to be such dispositions as benevolence and generosity; 
such affections as love, friendship, compassion, gratitude. These sentiments have their causes, effects, objects 
and operations, marked by common language and obsemation, and plainly distinguished from those of the 
selfish passions ... 1 shall not here enter into any detail on the present subject. Many able philosophers have 
shown the insufficiency of these systems. And 1 shall take for granted what, 1 believe, the smallest reflection 
will make evident to every impartial enquirer". (ECPM 296,298) For a somewhat more detailed discussion 
of Hume's views on the egoism of these writers see David Hume, pp. 43-48. 
39 Hume says that "there arecertain calm desires and tendencies, which, tho' they be real passions, produce 
little emotion in the mind ... These desires in our natures, such as benevolence and resentment ... or the general 
appetite to good, and aversion to evil, consider'd merely as such ... The common error of metaphysicians has 
Secondly, if Hume's general account of the relationship between virtue and 
motivation is correct, the presupposition of the theist cannot be true. According to 
Hume, we assign moral blame to a person for not performing an action because we 
suppose that an individual in the circumstances this person was in "shoul'd be influenc'd 
by the proper motive of that action". If, however, we then find that this proper motive 
was in fact present and operating, but that its influence was prevented "by some 
circumstances unknown to us", we withdraw our ascription of blame, and may even 
assign moral praise. This fact indicates, he goes on, that "al1 virtuous actions derive their 
merit only from virtuous motives, and are consider'd merely as signs of those motives". 
And from this principle he concludes further that the virtuous motive from which an 
action derives its moral merit "can never be a regard to the virtue of that action". The 
action does not become virtuous (more accurately: the action cannot rightly be called 
virtuous) until it is desired for some reason that itself causes the action to be called 
virtuous in the first place. This other reason "must be some other natural motive or 
principle", and this other motive or pnnciple, Hume goes on to argue, is the desire to 
benefit others. Still other motives may well be reasonable, even natural, but no other 
motives can give rise to vlrtue. (T 477-78)40 
This teory of the origin of virtue in motivation will be relevant again below, but for 
the present it is clear that it runs directly counter to any suggestion that acts motivated 
by either fear of punishement or hope of reward can ever be virtuous acts; the only acts 
attaining moral merit are those motivated by a desire to benefit others. 
lain in ascribing the direction of the will entirely to one of these principles, and supposing the other to have 
no influence. Men often act knowlingly against their interest". (T 417-418) 
There is an element of ambiguity in the concept of fear found in much Christian teaching, such that fear as 
awe or respect is fundamental to the ethics of this teaching ("The fear of the Lord is the beginning of wisdom"), 
while fear in the more ordinary sense is the motivational complement of self-interested hope, or hope of 
reward. The anti-atheists seem to trade on this ambiguity: Hume seems perfectly willing to let them do so, and 
to take rhetorical advantage of this fact by treating the two of fear as one. 
40 Hume continues: "To suppose, that the mere regard to the virtue of the action, rnay be the first motive, 
which produc'd the action, and render'd it virtuous. is to reason in a circle. Before we can have such a regard, 
the action must be really virtuous: and this virtue must be deriv'd from some virtuous motive: And 
consequently the virtuous motive must be different from the regard to the virtue of the action ... Here is a man, 
that does many benevolent actions ... No character can be more arniable and virtuous. We  regard these actions 
as proofs of the greatest humanity. This hurnaniv bestows a mer.it o12 the actions. A regard to this merit is, 
therefore, a secondary consideration, and deriv'd from the antecedent principle of humanity, which is 
meritorious and laudable". (Emphasis added). 
James Tully has pointed out to me that some of those Hume is opposing would likely respond by claiming that, 
although religious belief or practice may begin in self-interest (fear for his or her eterna1 state leads the 
reprobate to act in accordance with the precepts of Chnstianity), it can go beyond that to the point that the saint 
loses al1 concem for self. This is an important claim, and one that Hume would have to take senously, for his 
own account of the development of the artificial virtues could be seen as a secularized version of a similar 
transition: a concem for my property can lead me to an overriding concern for justice, or the good of society. 
Hume's response, 1 speculate, would take the form of a reminder: the action of the saint may indeed be selfless, 
but this does not prove that such virtue originates in the fearof eterna1 punishment or the hope of etemalreward. 
On the contrary, it has its origin in a restncted and restricitve concern, that which gives rise to the artificial 
virtues. For an outline of the line of a further defense Pufendor might have taken in a response to cnticisms of 
his divine command theory. see the final section of the article by J. B. Schneewind cited in note 9. 
B. Virtue, at least for inferior individuals, consists in conforming one's behavior to 
rules or laws, while the supreme being rewards those who are virtuous (those, that is, 
who conform their behavior to the divine commands), and punishes those (the wicked) 
who do not; these rewards and punishments include those administered in an etemal 
extension of this life. 
About this claim Hume is dubious for a number of reasons, not the least being his 
doubts about the immortality of the soul and the existence of that other world in which 
such rewards and punishments are meted out. But his objections run beyond a mere 
freethinker's doubts about eternal life. As we have seen that he finds al1 attempts to 
found morality on self-interest to be inadequate, it is obvious that he must consider al1 
talk of etemal rewards and punishments quite beside the point of morality. It is possible 
that there are such rewards and punishments, but they cannot possibly be incentives to 
ijirtue, nor, on the other hand, can the performance of virtuous acts be of any religious 
significance. It is not a matter of virtue being its own reward. Hume appears to reject 
even so austere a prudentialism. It is, rather, that to fulfill a moral obligation is simply 
to do what one ought to do: "virtuous conduct is deemed no more than what we owe to 
society and to o u r ~ e l v e s " . ~ ~  
Furthermore, we lack entirely the grounds for extending our moral concepts to 
higher beings. Hume told Hutcheson that he had revised Book 111 of his Treatise in an 
effort to remove al1 those passages which might give offense to the religious. But despite 
this further round of prudential revision and the fact that Hume appears to direct his 
criticism merely at those now known as moral rationalists, the opening section of Book 
111 is clearly apposite to the point under discussion. 
Those who maintain an abstract rational difference between moral good and evil, 
Hume writes, suppose not only that these relations are eternal and immutable but also 
that their effects must necessarily be always the same and thus that they "have no less, 
or rather a greater, influence in directing the will of the deity, than in governing the 
rational and virtuous of our own species". But, he goes on: it is one thing to know virtue, 
and quite another to conform the will to it. These are distinct particulars. Consequently, 
in order to prove "that the measures of right and wrong are eternal laws, ohligutory on 
every rational mind", one would have to prove that the pretended connection between 
these allegedly eternal relations and the will is an absolutely invariable connection 
between aparticular cause and aparticular effect and is "so necessary. that in every well- 
disposed mind, it must take place and have its influence". No such proof is possible: 
41 The context in which this remark is made bears repeating here: "The duties. which aman  perfoms as a 
friend or parent, seem merely owing to his benefactor or children; nor can he be wanting to these duties, 
without breaking through al1 the ties of nature and morality. A strong inclination may prompt him to the 
performance: A sentiment of order or moral obligation joins its force to thesenatural ties: And the whole man, 
if truly virtuous, is drawn to his duty, without any effort or endeavour. Even with regard to the virtues, which 
are more austere, and more founded on reflection, such as public spirit, filial duty, temperance. or integrity: 
the moral obligation, in our apprehension, removes al1 pretension to religious merit; and the vimious conduct 
is deemed no more than what we owe to society and to ourselvel." (NHR XIV; W 4:358-59) 
1 have already prov'd, that even in human nature no relation can ever 
alone produce any action; besides this, 1 say, it has been shewn, in treating 
of the understanding, that there is no connexion of cause and effect, such as 
this is suppos'd to be, which is discoverable otherwise than by experience, 
and of which we can pretend to have any security by the simple consideration 
of the objects. Al1 beings in the universe, consider'd in themselves, appear 
entirely loose and independent of each other. 'This only by experience we 
leam their influence and connexion; and this influence we ought never to 
extend beyond experience ... we cannot prove a priori, that these relations, if 
they really existed and were perceiv'd, wou'd be universally forcible and 
obligatory. (T 465-66) 
In less elaborate terms, Hume is arguing that our knowledge in the domain of morals 
is subject to the very limitations that mark the rest of our knowledge. No matter what 
our subject, we are unable to go beyond expenence. Furthermore, just as our experience 
innatural philosophy and (as we now might say) philosophy of mind or psychology fails 
to provide knowledge of a deity whose operations solve metaphysical or epistemologi- 
cal problems, so does it fail in morals. Efforts to found morality and obligation on etemal 
relations deriving from the deity are bound tofail because, as morality is apractical affair 
involving matters of fact (agents, actions, situations, assessments), the relations be- 
tween these components are, like al1 such factual relations, contingent. It appears, them, 
that morality must be a purely human affair. It is concerned with human actions in the 
present sphere, it rests on human nature, and it is dependent upon human experience 
alone. As Hume expressed his general view in a letter: "Morality ... regards only human 
Nature & human ~ i f e " . ~ ~  
A. Inferior and dependent individuals owe an allegiance to the superior being on 
whom they depend. 
Hume's objections to this presupposition rest on fundamental and complex compo- 
nents of his system. and hence are difficult to state briefly. Building on the discussion 
just completed, one could say that, according to Hume, the theist claims to trace moral 
obligation to the cornmandof the deity, but whathe infactdoes is toprojectonto aputative 
deity principles and precepts of purely human derivation and application. These he 
would then have us suppose to be derived from the deity, but in point of fact, so far as 
Hume is concerned, the theist has salted an otherwise empty mine. 
42 Letiers ofDavidHurne, I,40, Hume's argument in the Treaise is generally supposed to be directed against 
therationalists. He therementions only Wollaston, but thesecondE~zqu~r-y indicates that he also hadMalebranche, 
Cudworth, and Clarke in mind. (ECPM 197) The argument bears equally against other ethical theones 
dependent upon claims that neither have been nor can be confirned by experience. If it is argued that the divine 
command theory is the contrary of that of Cudworth and the other rationalists -that it is voluntaristic and 
based on a revelation that does or may run contrary to reason -then one need only to tum to "Of Miracles" 
to determine Hume's response to an ethics that in this altemative manner takes us beyond, perhaps further 
beyond, our experience. 
Hume has no interest in doubting or denying that there are obligation such as those 
we are put in mind of by the term allegiance. He even grants that individuals who are 
specially aided by other individuals owe a debt of gratitude to those who have given the 
aid, and he suggests that aform of ingratitude, patncide, is the most vicious of al1 crimes. 
But allegiance itself, he argues, arises not from the foundation of a dependent relation- 
ship. It arises, rather, from private interest controlled by private interest itself, and then 
turned by purely human interventions into a mundane and secular, but genuine, social 
virtue. A moralist who concerns himself with a putative allegiance to the deity is 
pursuing a pointless and potentially dangerous speculation that necessarily carries him 
quite beyond the moral domain. 
In somewhat more detail: Hume objects to certain moral theories because they 
presuppose precisely those fundamental moral concepts whose presence and signifi- 
cance need to be explained, and he goes on to offer the needed e ~ ~ l a n a t i 0 1 - 1 . ~ ~  The ex- 
planation that he gives, assuming it is correct, reveals that the divine command theory 
is entirely mistaken in its account of the nature and origin of allegiance, justice, and other 
such virtues. 
Hume distinguishes between naturul and artificial virtues. The former are those 
qualities (for example: beneficence, generosity, clemency, temperance, frugality, 
enterprise, greatness of mind) that, like al1 virtues, "acquire our approbation, because 
of their tendency to the good of mankind" but are distinguished from other virtues 
insofar as they are the result of some natural passion or fundamental propensity of 
human nature itself. In addition, the good that the natural virtues produce "arises from 
every single act" of this sort. In contrast, although the artificial virtues (for example: 
justice, promise-keeping. allegiance, chastity), can also be traced, ultimately, to human 
nature, they are the result of though, reflection, or contnvance - o f  human artifice- 
and are further distinguished by the fact that "a simple act of justice [for example], 
consider'd in itself, may often be contrary to the public good". Where the artificial 
virtues are concerned, it is "only the concurrente of mankind, in a general scheme or 
system of action", and the effort to maintain this system at full strength, which in such 
a case contributes to the good of mankind". (T 5 7 8 - 7 9 1 ~ ~  
43 Hume says that the "ideas" of property, right, and obligaiion "are altogether unintelligible without first 
understanding" the idea of justice, one of the most important virtues. He then adds: "Those, therefore, who 
~ n a k e  use of the wordproperty. or right, orobligation, before they have explained the origin ofjustice, or even 
make use of [these words] in that explication, are guilty of a very gross fallacy, and can never reason upon 
any solid foundation ... 'Tis very preposterous. therefore, to imagine that we can have any idea of propeny, 
without fully comprehending the nature of justice. and shewing its origin in the artifice and conuivance of 
men". (T 490-91) This remark should be compared to that of Barbeyrac, found above, p. 109. 
44 This distincion between the natural and the artificial vinues is found in severa1 places in Hurne's writings. 
In his essay "Of the Original Contract" it is put very succintly: "Al1 nzoral duties may be divided into two kinds. 
Thefirsr are those, to which men are impelled by a natural instinct or immediate propensity, which operates 
on them. independent of al1 ideas of obligation, andof al1 views. either topublic orprivate utility. Of this nature 
are, love of children, gratitude to benefactors, pity to the unfortunate. When wereflect on the advantage, which 
results to society from such humane instincts, we pay them the just tribute of moral approbation and esteem: 
But the person. actuated by them. feels their power and influence, anteceden1 to any such reflection. 
Justice is the paradigm artificial virtue on Hume's account. Briefly stated, it is 
Hume's view that, while justice is in fact a full-fledged virtue -acts of justice are acts 
done for the good of mankind- justice has its foundation in another natural human 
propensity, our pronounced tendency to pursue or protect our private interests, and also 
in the fact that certain desirable goods are in relatively short supply. Treating this theory 
as a historical claim, we can say that when this situation is first comprehended-at a time 
before justice has become a virtue- individual humans realize that their private or 
individual interests will best be served by the kind of cooperation that allows each 
individual to retain control over those goods which he or she has obtained. Hume traces 
the beginnings of such cooperation to the natural attraction between the sexes, and the 
consequent development of the family, and thus to human nature itself, but our principal 
concern here is not with beginnings but with development and transformation. How 
does one's private interest in retaining the goods one controls contribute to the 
development of a virtue that cannot be, on Hume's theory, performed out of private 
interest? Or how, we might ask, are we able to transform one and the same act from an 
act of protojustice into a genuine act of justice? 
Given that Hume insists that it is a difference of motive that distinguishes acts of 
proto-virtue from acts of genuine virtue, he must suppose that we are able to change our 
motivation so that we seek for the good of others that which we previously sought only 
out of private i n t e r e ~ t s . ~ ~  But granting this, the question returns in another form: What 
enables us to uphold, say, a system of rules for the transference of property not merely 
out of the self-interest that gave rise to this system but out of a concern for the good of 
others, including the good of remote and even unknown persons? 
The answer lies in the operation of sympathy, or in the ability of humans to 
communicate feelings and sentiments from one to another and thus to share ends or aims. 
Because of this ability 1 am able to discover that just as 1 approve of those acts of others 
that enable me to retain control of my goods, so do others approve of those acts of mine 
that enable them to retain control of their goods. It then happens that individuals are 
sometimes motivated to uphold this system of rules simply because such an action 
benefits and pleases those other individuals who are aware of it. In short, by the 
operation of sympathy men sense that an act of proto-justice benefits others, and even 
mankind in general. Consequently, at some point (very early) in the history of mankind 
one or more individuals was motivated to perform an act of proto-justice, but for a new 
and qualitatively different reason: in order to bring about the good of others. At that 
moment, that individual or set of individuals performed not an act or acts of proto- 
justice, but a virtuous act or acts, and the virtue of justice came into being. 
"The second kind of moral duties are such as are not supported by any original instinct of nature. but are 
performed entirely from a sense of obligation, when we consider the necessities of human society, and the 
impossibility of supporting it, if these duties were neglected. It is thus jirstice or a regard to the property of 
others,fidelity or the observante of promises, become obligatory, and acquire an authority over mankind. 
(W 3: 454-55) 
45 Although one wishes that Hume had said more about the transfomation of self-interest into virtue, he is 
at least clear that the artificial virtues arise in the manner outlined here: "Afterwards a sentiment of morals 
concurs with interest, and becomes a new obligation upon mankind. (T 523) 
Hume offers the same general account of each of the artificial virtues. Allegiance 
begins as proto-allegiance, or as an acceptance of govemment for reasons of self- 
interest. It cannot be traced to adivine cornrnand, nor even to the superiority of a supreme 
being. On the contrary, allegiance, or the moral duty of submission to government, arises 
first from the recognition that in certain circumstances one's interests require that there 
be a civil government capable of protecting those interests. In those circumstances, meri 
"naturally assemble together ... chuse magistrates, determine their power, andpronzise 
them obedience", the convention of promise-keeping already having been established 
as a part of the fundamentals of justice. (T 541) In the course of time, again because of 
the operation of sympathy, those who are govemed begin to see that submission to the 
government is in the public interest. Because, as Hume puts it, we see that in large 
societies the execution of justice -the carrying out of certain activities which benefit 
mankind in general- is "impossible, without submission to govemment", we first 
establish a magistrate, and then later give him our allegiance simply because we want 
to foster this general benefit. (T 546) As soon as that happens the viitue of allegiance 
arises. Allegiance is merely a humanly created, "factitious" duty of obedience, a duty 
whose "sole foudation", he says, "is the advantage, which it procures to society, by 
preserving peace and order among mankind". (ECPM 2 0 5 ) ~ ~  
Of central importance in the present context, however, is the fact that for Hume 
allegiance is limited by self-interest, which is to say that our obligation to the magistratel 
monarch is not absolute. Citizens owe the magistrate allegiance, but they are not merely 
his creatures or his property, over which he has an absolute authonty or right. And 
because our conceptions of allegiance and obligation derive from this secular context 
and are informed and controlled by it, there can be no ground for supposing that our 
allegiance to the deity must be of a different, unmitigated sort, especially as there is 
inadequate evidence for supposing the deity has been significantly concerned with the 
formation and operation of the u n i v e r ~ e . ~ ~  
46 Hume's account of the origin of government and allegiance first appeared in the Trearise, 3.2.7-10. A 
shorter version was published as "Of the Origin of Govemment", in the 1777 edition of the Essays urzd 
Trearises, and ir found at W 4: 113-17. The fact that the essay was one of the last of the works for whichHume 
arranged publication suggests that he attached great importance to the subject, and also reveals tlie continuity 
of his though on this matter. In both the Treutise and the posthumous essay he traces the origin of government 
to the need to overcome our tendency to overlook our real or distant interests in favour of apparent or present 
attractions, and both present allegiance as a "factitious duty of obedience'' or submission to the magistrate, 
but thisphraseis from theessay of 1777. In the TreatiseHume says that"allgovemment is plainly an invention 
of men". Consequently. allegiance, on his view, is also ahuman invention. (T 542) 
' The anti-atheists may seem to have a ready and valid objection to Hume's account of obligation: it is not 
in fact an account of ohl~gaiion, but merely one possible description of the manner in which the sense o f d u ~  
arises. And even those who do not share the religious commitments of the anti-atheists may feel that Hume, 
in an effort to demystify morality by stripping it of its transcendental elements, has not so much explained 
obligation as he has explained it away, into a (mere) sense of duty: obliguilon entails an obilger, separate from 
the individual obliged. it mey be thought. But, bearing in mind that Hume insists that this sense of duty has 
a genuine foundation in human nature, his explanation seems entirely consistent with his general philosophi- 
cal progran?. It appears to be an analogue, for example, of his explanation of the ideaof necessary connection. 
And the feeling that obligation, to be genuine, necessarily entails more than mere inner compulsion, may be 
Hume is known, justifiably, as a skeptic, andespecially as areligious skeptic. He was 
not content, however, to establish himself as a mere scoffer, or articulate village atheist, 
not even to the world at large. But he expressed his dissatisfaction with the role religion 
had played in human life -with the two hundred years of religious strife that followed 
upon the Protestant Reformation; with the effects of the more unified Christian church 
of the pre-Reformation period; with religion wherever he found it in his extensive 
researches into human history. One of his interlocutors (the Epicurean of the first 
Enquiry) is made to complain about those who use the religious hypothesis as the basis 
for concluding that this life is "merely a passage to something farther; a porch, which 
leads to a greater, and vastly different building; a prologue, which serves only to 
introduce the piece, and give it more grace and propriety". The same interlocutor then 
goes on to insist that inferring from the course of nature to aUparticular intelligent cause" 
of order is "both uncertain and useless". Uncertain because "the subject lies entirely 
beyond the reach of human expenence"; useless because we can never "retum back from 
the cause with any new interference, or... establish any new principles of conduct and 
behavior". (ECHU 141-42) Granted, in this particular context Hume continues the 
conversation by doubting whether or not what ought to be the case (that life be free of 
the influence of "religious doctrines and reasonings") actually is or can be the case, and 
he even suggests that, while religious views are ill-founded, they do have a beneficial 
effect on society for they help to restrain men's passions. 
But Hume did not leave it at that. The bulk of his writings suggest that his view of 
the matter is essentially that of the Epicurean: morality ought to be free of the influence 
of religion and religious belief and is in fact built on an entirely different foundation. 
Thus while Hume is a religious sceptic and a sceptic about religiously based moral 
systems, he is not, and did not conceive himself to be, a moral sceptic. He is: rather, a 
huinanist: he atteinpts to show that the foundation of a genuine morality lies in human 
nature itself. He showed what he took to be the failures of religion, but he also tried to 
show that man himself is responsible for the existence of society, and for its generally 
beneficial organization. Of course, his optimism was limited. He did not suppose 
mankind an entirely benevolent species. He did not suppose that a completely enlight- 
ened society was imminent, or even a long-range prospect. But he did see evidence of 
some generosity, of some virtuous motives, and of some significant rationality. It was 
on this foundation in human nature that he thought man had built. "Tho' justice be 
artificial", he wrote, "the sense of its morality is natural". To those who might think he 
was offering a merely relativistic account of these artificial virtues he went on to say: 
a mere vestige of transcendentally based morality. But even if there is a satisfactory Humean response to this 
objection, it does appear that Hume's account of obligation is underdeveloped. Knud Haakonssen has pointed 
this out and gone on to suggest how on Hume's view we develop obligations to justice, fidelity, allegiance, 
and the remaining artificial virtues. See "Hume's Obligations", Hltnze Studies 4 (1978), 7-17, reprinted in 
Haakonssen's valuable The Science ofalegislator: TheNaturalJurisprltdence ofDai'ldHunze & Adan~  Smitl~ 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981), pp. 30-35. 
Most of the inventions of men are subject to change. They depend upon 
humour and caprice. They have a vogue for a time, and then sink into 
oblivion. It may, perhaps, be apprehended, that if justice were allow'd to be 
ahuman invention, it must be plac'd on the same footing. But the cases are 
widely different. The interest, on which justice is founded, is the greatest 
imaginable, and extends to al1 times and places. It cannot possibly be serv'd 
by any other invention. It is obvious, and discovers itself on the very first 
formation of society. Al1 these causes render the rules of justice stedfast and 
immutable; at least, as immutable as human nature. (T 619-20) 
Hume saw, correctly, 1 suggest, that morality is autonomous. It is, or at least it ought 
to be, free from the putative authority of religion and religious belief. He also thought 
it genuine, its distinctions in an important sense real, founded on the nature of mankind 
and the world in which we live. 
